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This thesis studies the different strategies and initiatives followed by Portuguese banks to 
achieve the targets set by the economic adjustment programme and their impact on the 
banking sector’s profitability. I analyse what banks have undertaken in terms of capital 
level and other sources of financing. I also address the issue of deleveraging by studying 
the evolution of the loan portfolio as well as risk weighted assets. Finally, I analyse the 
impact of those changes on the bank’s net interest incomes and cost to income ratio. Using 
a sample composed of four major Portuguese banks, I conclude that banks have become 
safer but still need to make some effort to achieve stability.  
 






Portuguese banks, as opposed to many other European banks, managed the first part of 
the crisis pretty well mainly because of their lack of exposure to toxic assets such as 
subprimes (European Commission, 2011). However, the Portuguese banking system had 
some major weaknesses that made it vulnerable later on in the crisis. First of all, it had a 
very weak liquidity position, being too dependent on wholesale and interbank borrowing 
with an average loan-to-deposit ratio of 160% until mid-2010 (European Commiss ion, 
2011), much higher than the European Union average. Furthermore, the proportion of real 
estate and mortgage loans, as a percentage of total credit outstanding, was high and 
Portuguese families were extremely indebted, making loans to that sector very vulnerab le. 
In 2010, total outstanding residential loans amounted to 66.2% of the Portuguese GDP 
(European Mortgage Federation, 2013). The other major weakness lies in their increasing 
exposure to sovereign risk, 4.1% of the total assets in January 2011 (Banco de Portugal, 
2011). Therefore, financial markets had poor expectations on the sustainability of public 
finances which led to a strong increase in risk premium on sovereign debt. This had 
negative repercussions on the Portuguese banking system’s access and funding costs in 
the international wholesale debt markets (Banco de Portugal 2010). In this context, 
Portuguese banks were, therefore, facing restrictions on access to interbank money 
market financing, which led to a worsening in their liquidity situation (Banco de Portugal, 
2010). 
In April 2011, the Portuguese government, saw a significant decline in its credit rating to 
below investment grade, making it impossible for banks to fully rediscount Portuguese 
sovereign debt at the European Central Bank, negotiated with the Troika (European 





covering the period from 2011 to 2014 consisting of a financial package of up to 78 billion 
euros for potential fiscal financing needs and support to the banking system. One of the 
programme’s objective was the stabilisation of the financial sector (European 
Commission, 2011). In order to achieve this goal, the banking sector was asked to work 
on the four following pillars (Banco de Portugal, 2012): reinforcing the solvency of the 
banking system, promoting a gradual an orderly deleveraging of the banking system and 
ensuring the stable funding of the banking system, reinforcing the supervision of the 
banking system and strengthening the regulatory framework. 
For the purpose of this work, I will only focus on the two first pillars. As far as the first 
pillar is concerned, Portuguese banks were required to achieve a Core Tier 1 ratio of 9% 
by the end of 2011 and of 10% by the end of 2012. As far as the deleveraging of the 
banking system is concerned, banks were asked to reduce their tremendously high credit-
to-deposit ratio to 120% by the end of 2014.  
The objective of the paper is to identify what strategies and initiatives the four major 
Portuguese banks (Espirito Santo Group, Banco BPI, Caixa Geral de Depósitos and 
Banco Comercial Português) have undertaken in order to achieve those two targets. The 
study will cover different aspects such as capital requirements, risk weighted assets and 
banks business models. Once key trends are identified, the paper will go further into the 
impact of those changes on banks profitability and risk profile. 
The work is divided up as follows: section II presents the literature review of the subject, 
section III presents the strategy followed by banks, section IV explains the impact of the 







Following the goals set by the adjustment programme, banks are required to have a Core 
Tier 1 ratio of 9 per cent by the end of 2011 and of 10 per cent by the end of 2012.  
The Core Tier 1 measure is “based on the Basel III rules applicable in 2013 for the 
definition of Common Equity Tier 1, i.e. prior to the application of the transitory regime 
for certain deductions. In particular, it does not include the deduction for investments in 
financial institutions which do not consolidate, nor the deduction for deferred tax assets” 
(Banco de Portugal, 2012).  
In order to reach capital requirements, banks can work on the two sides of the division. 
Banks can deleverage either by recapitalising or by reducing risk weighted assets, with 
different economic consequences (Vause et al., 2012). Working on the numerator would 
imply managing capital, raising new capital, retaining profits/dividends and margin 
growth and working on the denominator would imply selling assets, managing risk 
weighted assets, deleveraging and changing business models. 
Impact on Profitability 
At the time of the implementation of the adjustment programme, Portugal was entering a 
deep recession, which resulted in the deterioration of the borrowers’ credit quality 
(Banco de Portugal, 2011). With frozen wholesale markets and a steep increase in bond 
yields, banks were and are still facing an increasing cost of financing combined with 
deteriorating asset values. Banks more exposed to mortgages have difficulty in impacting 
a higher cost of funds on the rate charged to existing clients.  
Banks are currently facing an environment with lower returns on capital and slower 
growth. Higher capital requirements primarily impact areas such as sales and trading, 





To counter this decreasing profitability, banks have many options. They might consider 
restructuring their balance sheet in order to improve the quality of capital and reduce 
capital needs arising from Basel III’s deductions as well as managing more effective ly 
scarce balance-sheet resources. They can also adjust their business-model to create more 
capital and liquidity efficient business models and products. Along this, they should also 
rethink the scope and even the viability of specific business lines. All these actions might 
mitigate up to 40% the decrease in ROE. It is however unlikely that banks will ever reach 
ROE’s with level similar to those achieved before the financial crisis (McKinsey & 
Company, 2010). 
Working on the Capital Side 
In order to meet these challenges, banks can align current capital, liquidity-measurement 
and profit and loss accounting practices with the new regulation. According to the 
industry’s experience with BASEL II, its implementation by banks under IRB (interna l 
ratings) can mitigate about 20% of the effects of higher capital requirements. This might 
restore up to 0.5% of lost return on equity (ROE). Banks can also restructure their balance 
sheet. The issues raised by balance sheet restructuring contribute to 40% of the overall 
ROE impact. Assuming 50% of this can be addressed by actions such as reducing DTAs 
or optimizing the financial investment and corporate shareholding structure, and by 
reducing funding cost through an on-going balance sheet management, between 0.5 and 
1 percentage point of ROE, can be saved (McKinsey & Company, 2010). 
Risk Weighted Assets 
With Basel III, RWA optimisation can become more important, since increasing the 






 In the previous decade, banks surprisingly decreased their risk weighted assets as a 
percentage of total assets, going from 44% to 39% from 2000 to 2010 in Europe and in 
the United States, and more precisely from 40% to 33% within the same time period in 
the Eurozone (Accenture, 2012). Changes in business models were observed, with a shift 
from high to low risk weighted asset activities. Because credit risk accounts for a major 
part in risk weighted assets, most banks reduced their loan size as a percentage of total 
assets. Accenture has identified key factors that influence banks’ risk weighted assets. 
The first key driver is a bank’s risk profile, which is closely tied to individual choices 
such as business models as well as macroeconomic and institutional factors. For example, 
there is a significant correlation between loans as a share of total assets and the density 
of RWA. Not only does the share of the loan have an impact on RWA but also the credit 
risk associated with those loans. The business model accounts, on average, for 50% of 
the total RWA density. The composition of the loan portfolio is also important. Banks 
with more corporate loans, particularly to small and medium size enterprises, tend to have 
a higher RWA density (Accenture, 2012). 
Since the Basel committee has allowed and encouraged banks to develop their own risk 
measurement tools, risk management has also become a factor impacting risk weighted 
assets.  The way banks measure credit analysis, monitoring and recovery has a significant 
influence on the major risk parameters, especially on probability of default and loss given 
default (Accenture, 2012). However, one should bear in mind that through the use of 
internal risk assessment methods, larger banks might be able to reduce their RWA without 
truly mitigating risks. Their internal assessment of the required capital charges might be 







The effects of further debt reduction and deleveraging in the financial sector depend on 
how it takes place. An increase in equity, if feasible, is an expensive solution but on the 
other hand, if deleveraging is undertaken by reducing assets, especially loans to the non-
financial sector, to well below demand by households and businesses, this would cause a 
credit crunch with serious adverse consequences for growth (Bouis, 2013). 
Some economists are stating that banks are too big nowadays and that deleveraging 
should be undertaken until banks cut all their non-core business lines (Wehinger, 2012). 
As from 2011, European banks, therefore, sold large volumes of assets, especially high 
risk weights assets such as low-rated securitised assets, distressed bonds and commercia l 
property and other risky loans. They also sold assets with market prices close to holding 
values (Vause et al., 2012).  French and Spanish banks sold dollar-funded assets and 
foreign operations to focus only on their core activities and a lot of UK banks decreased 
the size of their balance sheet. Industry experts estimate that European banks will dispose 
of about 0.5 to 3 trillion euros in the coming years (Bank for International Settlements, 
2012). 
Changes in Business Models 
Banks can also review their business models and see which business segments will remain 
profitable with the new regulations (McKinsey & Company, 2010). Banks need to rethink 
their portfolio strategy with particular attention to how the new capital, liquidity, funding 
and leverage requirements affect each segment and product. They might redesign 
products to ensure client needs while optimizing the bank’s capital and liquidity, for 





receivables which reduce their RWA by nearly half. Other strategies can be the use of 
product bundles that combine financing and deposits, special offers to attract stable 
funding in the form of retail and SME deposits, increasing the proportion of short-
maturity lending to reduce funding costs (more revolving loans, less corporate mortgages) 
(McKinsey & Company, 2010). 
Changes might also be made on the customer side, with a higher focus on customer’s 
segments that generate higher returns. To see if a segment is attractive or not, banks will 
consider not only segment growth and economics but also the required capital and funding 
to serve the segment. On the other hand, banks will probably cut some client segments 
that account for a big RWA share and do not generate enough return (especially in the 
corporate sector). A high focus will also be given on clients that have a low-default rate. 
Banks are likely to convert a part of their clients’ investment portfolio into deposits. 
(McKinsey & Company, 2010). 
Banks can also focus on geographical distribution, in order to find a solution that 
minimizes capital and funding requirements (McKinsey & Company, 2010).  
Finally, banks should consider the future profitability of their existing businesses given 
the new regulatory framework and different mitigation solutions. They can try to find 
ways to modify prices and cut costs in order to remain profitable. If it is not sufficient, 
they might want to consider exit strategies for some of their business lines, even if that 






Bank’s strategies after the crisis  
This section is dedicated to the analysis of the strategy followed by the four major 
Portuguese financial groups to achieve the objectives set by the adjustment program. The 
analysis is based on data taken from the four banks annual reports (2005 to 2013). 
Espirito Santo Group 
Target Ratios 
Espirito Santo’s loan to deposit ratio stood at 192% in 2009 and has been gradually 
decreasing every year since, reaching 121% at the end of 2013, close to the 120% 
threshold imposed by the economic adjustment program for the end of 2014. Core tier 1 
ratio, which was 8% in 2009, increased and reached 10.6% at the end of 2013. Appendix 
1 shows the evolution of those ratios throughout the years. 
Capital 
In order to comply with the core tier 1 ratio target, BES undertook several actions to 
increase its share capital. In December 2011, they concluded a debt to equity exchange, 
raising 530 million in capital. In May 2012, they raised about 1,009 billion euros in capital 
through the successful issue of about 2,556 billion shares. Appendix 2 summarizes 
Espirito Santo capital level throughout the years. Share capital therefore increased by 
44% between 2010 and 2013, leading the equity to account for 8.75% of total sources of 
financing in 2013, which is globally more than in the nine previous years. The need to 
raise capital was a necessity, not only to comply with capital ratios, but also to cover the 
losses they were facing. In 2011, because of huge amounts of loans and other assets 
impairments, BES’s net income decreased drastically and was even negative in 2013.  
Sources of Financing 
A strong focus has been set on increasing deposits, through the acquisition of new clients. 





Seguros Tranquilidade, the life insurance company held by Espirito Santo Group. They 
have also launched marketing campaigns as well as innovative savings solutions that 
allow customers to save as from a minimum of 10 euros a month. Deposits therefore 
increased by 19.51% between 2010 and 2013, going from 30.919 billion euros to 36.831 
billion (Appendix 3). In 2009, they accounted for as low as 30.92% of the total source of 
financing and gradually increased since then. In 2013, they accounted for 45.69%, a level 
almost similar to 2004. 
As far as other sources of financing are concerned, there has been an increasing reliance 
on deposits from central banks (mostly European Central Bank) which accounted for 
11.82% of the total sources in financing in 2013 whereas it accounted for only 1.16% ten 
years ago. This increase was particularly marked in 2010 and 2011 and stable after, the 
objective being, indeed, to mitigate this dependence. The share of debt securities and 
subordinated debt decreased a lot reflecting the high difficulty of Portuguese banks to 
borrow on capital markets. Debt securities, which accounted for as much as 40.22% in 
2009, represented only 14.79% of total sources of financing in 2013.  
Loan portfolio 
Espirito Santo decided to run a deleveraging programme mid-2010, before being forced 
to do so by the economic adjustment program. They first cut loans, especially 
international loans in order not to harm the Portuguese economy. On a global scale, the 
gross loan portfolio decreased by 5.5% between 2010 and 2013. This fall was first due to 
a sharp decrease in corporate loans, which represent about 73% of the loan portfolio. 
However, since 2011, mortgage loans and other loans to individuals have decreased a lot 
more. The evolution of the loan portfolio throughout the years is shown in Appendix 4. 





on international loans. However, the international loan portfolio decreased from 2010 to 
2011 but increased after 2011. The reduction operated as from 2010 came only from 
domestic loans: by the end of 2013, BES indeed sold about 3 billion of those loans on 
markets. Secondly, BES was more selective when granting new loans. More guarantees 
were required and they looked for higher quality loans. Finally, one should bear in mind 
that the contraction of the loan portfolio is also due to a decreasing demand for loans, 
especially for mortgages and other types of individual loans (consumption loans etc.), 
because of the economic conditions. 
Risk Weighted Assets 
Along with its capital increase, BES also undertook a decrease of the risk weighted assets 
which decreased from 68.802 billion in 2010 to 57.492 billion in 2013 i.e. a 16.44% 
decrease (Appendix 6). To perform this drastic reduction, BES had to cut some loans and 
business lines. In 2011, they reached an agreement to sell their share capital of the 
subsidiary in the United Kingdom, ESAF alternative asset management and also sold 
securities portfolio for an amount of 1.7 billion. In 2013, they sold most of their stake in 
EDP, the major electricity provider of Portugal. In 2012, they acquired 50% of the shares 
of BES Vida. In general, acquiring an insurance business has a positive impact on core 
Tier 1 ratio since it brings steady cash flows and it is not very risky. The total amount of 
assets however remained quite stable (a small decrease of 2.05% from 2009 to 2013), 
which means that the reduction in risk weighted assets came from a recomposition of 
assets. Loans to customers accounted for 57.48% of total assets in 2013 whereas they 
accounted for 59.51% of the total assets in 2009 and 61.41% in 2010. On the other hand, 





Assets held for sales are valued at market price, which means that losses are already 
recognised.   
Banco BPI 
Target Ratios 
BPI’s loan to deposit ratio was 131.7% and has been gradually decreasing every year 
since then, reaching 96% at the end of 2013. Attention should be paid to the fact that this 
relatively low loan-to-deposit ratio is due to the extremely low loan to deposit ratio of the 
international activity (20.5% in 2012). In Portugal, in 2012 for example, loan-to-deposit 
ratio was still 129.2%. Core tier 1 ratio which was 7.8% in 2009 was well managed and 
stood at the end of 2013 at a 16.5% level. Appendix 6 shows the evolution of the target 
ratios throughout the years. 
Capital 
Share capital increased only once since the crisis:  200 million euros raised by 
shareholders in 2012. In addition to that, BPI also issued a 1.500 million euro in 
contingent convertible subordinated bonds (CoCo’s) with a five year maturity, subscribed 
for by the Portuguese state in June 2012. CoCo’s are hybrid capital instruments. It is a 
debt that absorbs losses and therefore becomes equity when capital fall under a certain 
level. They issued it in order to comply with the sovereign debt buffer imposed by the EU 
and the ECB to cover their exposure on Portuguese and Greek sovereign debts. BPI 
immediately reimbursed 200 million thanks to the capital increase they made in 2012. In 
2013, they reimbursed an additional 280 million euros. This early reimbursement allowed 
them to get rid of the high interest costs associated with this hybrid capital instrument.  
Equity increased as from 2012, thanks to the 2012 profit as well as to the positive change 
in fair value reserve, linked to the increase in public debt bonds value and an increase 





of financing, equity has remained constant throughout the years, between 4 and 5% during 
the nine previous years. Consolidated net income was negative in 2011 because of large 
impairments on their Greek debt but was positive during the two following years, which 
is probably why they didn’t try to raise share capital at any cost. 
Sources of financing 
The bank has striven to increase customer deposits and it actually increased from 14.56% 
for the period going from 2009 to 2013. The biggest increase was in 2011 (7%). 
(Appendix 8) However, there is no particular strategy to increase customer deposits 
mentioned in BPI’s annual reports. As a percentage of total sources of financing, deposits 
have slightly increased, reaching 59.71% in 2013. As far as other sources of financing are 
concerned, we can see the increasing weight that resources from central banks has taken 
and the decreasing weight of debt securities and even subordinated debts.  
Loan Portfolio 
The size of the loan portfolio decreased, due to the higher selectivity in granting loans, 
higher spreads on new loans (because of the higher funding costs on the Portuguese 
market) but also a smaller demand due to the economic conditions. BPI even had the 
objective of reducing the loan portfolio by 1 billion euros, by cutting corporate, 
institutional, as well as project finance’s loans. Therefore, domestic corporate banking 
loans decreased by 25.66% from 2010 to 2013.  As for Banco Espirito Santo, BPI strategy 
kept focusing on lending to Portuguese SME’s, especially exporting companies. 
Appendix 9 summarizes the evolution of BPI’s loan portfolio. 
The share of international loans decreased from 21.42% in 2009 to 14.06% in 2013, 
reflecting BPI’s willingness to cut international loans in order to limit their impact on the 





As a percentage of assets, loans and advances from customers represented only 60.81% 
of total assets in 2013, which is the lowest figure of the nine previous years. 
Risk Weighted Assets 
BPI increased its financial advisory activity, mainly in the health, infrastructure and 
transportation sectors. Assets under management decreased, partly explained by the 
transfer of retirement-pension to the social security system (pension fund assets worth 
1.373 billion euro). BPI also focused on the sale of insurance, business with lower risks 
and high commissions, through their 35% in Allianz Portugal, the Portuguese branch of 
the insurance world leader. Risk weighted assets declined from 26.0358 billion in 2009 
to 21.0160 billion in 2013, a 19.26% decrease, with the highest year to year decrease 
being from 2012 to 2013 (-14.26%) (Appendix 10).  
Another trend in the asset side is the increasing share of financial assets held for sale in 
BPI’s total assets that accounted for 22.70% of the bank balance sheet in 2013, reflecting 
the priority given at selling financial assets to decrease risk weighted assets and capital 
requirements.  
Caixa Geral de Despositos 
Targets Ratios 
Caixa Geral de Depositos’ loan-to-deposit ratio was at a 133.6% level in 2009 and even 
at a 136.0% level in 2010. The bank then began a deleveraging process and the loan-to-
deposit ratio quickly decreased reaching a 103.6% level in 2013. As far as capital ratios 
are concerned, core tier 1 ratio was 8.30% in 2009 and increased year by year to reach 
11.5% in December 2013 (Appendix 11). 
Capital 
In order to achieve the capital ratio requirements, CGD increased its share capital by 100 





the Portuguese state who is its sole shareholder). Share capital evolution is shown in 
Appendix 12. Another reason why the need to raise capital was strong is the losses the 
bank was constantly reporting on the balance sheet as from 2011, due to very high level 
of loan impairments. In addition to that, they raised 900 million by issuing Coco’s, which 
is also considered as being part of the Core Tier 1 capital. The Portuguese state subscribed 
to the 900 million issue. Equity, as a percentage of total sources of financing, has not 
increased much in the previous years.  
Sources of financing 
Customer deposits increased from 60.209 billion in 2010 to 67.623 billion in 2013, a 
12.31% increase (Appendix 13). In order to achieve this growth, CGD has broadened its 
savings offers, strengthened by strong marketing and communication campaigns. The 
CGD’s international business has contributed the most to this growth. Indeed, deposits 
outside Portugal increased by 47.47% from 2010 to 2013 whereas in Portugal they only 
increased by 5.37% within the same time period and even decreased between 2012 and 
2013(Appendix 13). International deposits accounted for 16.45% of total deposits in 
2010. Thanks to their high growth, they accounted for 21.60% of total deposits in 2013.  
Customer resources (including deposits) accounted for 60.04% of total sources of 
financing in 2013, whereas they only accounted for 53.11% four years before. As far as 
other sources of financing are concerned, there is an increasing dependence on resources 
from central banks (5.35% of total sources of financing in 2009 and 11.61% in 2010, the 
ratio stabilized after) and a big decrease in debt securities as a percentage of total sources 
of financing (20.81% in 2009 and only 7.78% in 2013). 
Loans 
The loan portfolio decreased by 11.8% between 2010 and 2013. The contraction of the 





two following years the Portuguese sector was also affected by this loan. Despite its 
relatively small contribution to the loan portfolio (2.6% of the domestic loan portfolio in 
2010), it should be mentioned that loans to individuals except mortgage loans (car 
financing, credit for consumption …) were drastically reduced between 2010 and 2013 (-
32.51%). The share of international loans decreased slightly over the years. Appendix 14 
shows the evolution of CGD’s loan portfolio throughout the years. 
Risk Weighted Assets 
In 2011, CGD Group decided to increase its capital base, to reach the level required by 
the economic adjustment program. In order to do so, they focused on increasing deposits, 
selling their insurance business as well as their non-core assets and decreasing the volume 
of their international activity. CGD’s long term goal is to transform their business model, 
with a focus on services that depend less on net interest income. They want to become a 
multinational group focused on their banking business, lending mainly to export 
companies and taking savings from customer and corporate sectors, whereas they were, 
at that time, a highly diversified financial group. An example of non-core assets sale is 
the sale of its 6.1% equity stake in Portugal Telecom in November 2013. In the 
composition of assets, there were however no major change, the share of loans and 
advances to customers remained more or less stable as from the beginning of the 
adjustment program (63.83% in 2009 and 62.03% in 2013). There was a slight increase 




Millennium BCP reached a core tier one capital ratio of 13.8% at the end of 2013, from 





117% loan-to-deposit ratio at the end of 2013, slightly under the 120% threshold fixed by 
the economic adjustment programme for the end of 2014. In 2010, prior to the 
implementation of the programme, BCP’s loan-to-deposit ratio was 164% (Appendix 15). 
Capital 
Share capital increased in 2011 by 1.371 billion euros, mostly due to an exchange offer 
against subordinated perpetual securities but also due to the incorporation of issue 
premium reserves as well as a public offer for subscription. In 2012, 500 million euros 
were also raised through a public offer but later in 2012, share capital decreased by about 
3,065,000,000 euros. Half of this amount was aimed to cover the losses of 2011 and the 
other half was switched into the reserves to absorb future losses (Appendix 16). The bank, 
indeed, reported losses from 2011 to 2013. Core Tier 1 capital increased, due to the 
increase in share capital and in 2012, the reduction in share capital was offset by a 3 
billion Coco’s issue during the same year.  
Equity, however, as a percentage of total sources of financing decreased from 7.56% in 
2009 to 3.99% in 2013, because of the reduction in share capital and in preference shares.  
Sources of Financing  
Deposits increased by 7.57% from 2010 to 2013, even though there was a small decrease 
between 2012 and 2013(-0.78%) (Appendix 17). A strong focus was set in changing 
client’s savings habits and in attracting new customers through an extension of BCP’s 
savings offer or marketing campaigns such as in 2012 “monthly income deposits”, 
“special one top deposit”, “Olympic deposits” or “premium savings”, which allowed 
customers to save as little as 10 euro per month. Cross-selling of BCP’s products with 





Customer deposits, as a percentage of total sources of financing increased over the years, 
reaching 59.70% in 2013, whereas the share of debt securities decreased, reaching an all-
time low of 11.48% in 2013.  The share of deposits from central banks almost doubled in 
2010 but then decreased year after year.  
Loan Portfolio 
The loan portfolio decreased by 12.5% between 2010 and 2012. Reduction in loans to 
company contributed a lot to this decrease (-18.32% between 2010 and 2012).  Activit ies 
in Portugal have suffered from this decrease. In 2010, loans to Portuguese companies and 
individuals accounted for 77.11% of the total loan portfolio. In 2012, this figure decreased 
to 74.16%. The reasons for the decrease are first a decrease in demand, both from 
individuals and companies, due to the worsening of the economic conditions in Portugal 
and worldwide. Secondly, it comes from BCP’s higher selectivity in granting loans as 
well as a willingness to reduce the commercial gap. Finally, BCP has also sold some loans 
(more than 1 billion sold in 2012 for example). The evolution of the loan portfolio is 
shown in Appendix 23. 
As a percentage of total assets, loans to customers decreased to 69.27% in 2013, which is 
also an all-time low, counterbalanced by the increase of financial assets held for sale, 
reflecting BCP’s willingness to decrease the size of its balance sheet. 
Risk Weighted Assets 
Risk Weighted Assets decreased by 35.60% between 2010 and 2013, the largest reduction 
being in 2013 (Appendix 18). This reduction is a mix of several elements. First of all, the 
deleveraging process undertaken by BCP through loan sales and the reduction of activit ies 
had a positive impact on the decrease of risk weighted assets (4.649 billion euros in 2011 





computations also had an impact; risk weighted assets decreased by 750 million in 2011 
thanks to the implementation of IRB method for “Retail Revolving Exposures” and 
“Other Retail Exposures” and by 294 million euros in 2012 thanks to the change to the 
IRB method for “loans secured by residential real estate” and for “renewable positions”. 
There were also some smaller positive changes, such as the reduction of risk weights 
associated with the exposure to sovereign risk in Angola and Mozambique, or the focus 
on replacing short term loans to companies by factoring. On the other hand, the risk 
weight associated with the exposure to the sovereign risk of Portugal increased, which 
had a negative impact on BCP’s risk weighted assets (increase of 1,340 million in 2011). 
BCP undertook a major redefinition of its corporate strategy in which deleveraging had a 
central role. The following activities will be sold in the following years, which will have 
a huge impact on the reduction of risk weighted assets:  their subsidiary “Millennium 
Asset Management”, the loan book of BCP Cayman Islands and BCP Switzerland, 100% 
of their equity in Millennium Romania as well as in Piraeus, the bank that acquired BCP’s 
Greek division. This will lead to a big decrease in risk weighted assets. Furthermore, if 
they are not able to repay their Coco’s debt, they also agreed to sell their equity in BCP 
Poland.  
General Trends 
At the end of 2013, the four banks reached the targets set by the Troïka, except for Banco 
Espirito Santo that still has a loans-to-deposits ratio 1% higher than the objective. As far 
as Core Tier 1, the four banks reached the 10% target. 
The banks did increase their capital, raising money via the capital market for BES, BPI 
and BCP and via the Portuguese state for CGD. Increasing capital was even more 





BCP and CGD, raising money through capital markets was not enough to comply with 
the requirements and they used Coco’s as a way of reaching those targets. However, this 
was only punctual, the focus of the four banks to reach capital ratios was indeed to 
decrease risk weighted assets more than increasing capital, especially since Coco’s are 
extremely expensive. Therefore, they sold foreign subsidiaries and some equity stakes 
they had in non-banking companies. 
The loan portfolio of all the banks decreased, partly because of loan sales (corporate loans 
were the most affected), but also due to impairments, a decreasing demand for new loans , 
due to the poor economic conditions and finally a higher selectivity of the banks to grant 
new loans.  
As far as sources of financing are concerned, there was a strong focus in increasing 
deposits to have a more stable funding base and decrease the current dependence on 
central banks. This was done thanks to major marketing campaigns, cross-selling of 
products as well as launching of new savings solutions designed for customers that were 
not used to saving. Customer resources as a percentage of total sources of financ ing 
therefore increased and reached around 60% for BPI, CGD and BCP whereas for BES it 
is only 45%. As a result, the share of resources from central banks stabilized after a strong 
increase at the beginning of the crisis and the share of debt securities decreased.  
The strategies described above therefore explained how the four banks reached the 
targets. However, one should be careful when interpreting the loans-to-deposits ratios. 
The current formula used by banks to compute their loan-to-deposit-ratio is the total loan 
portfolio of the bank, net of impairment divided by the total volume of deposits of the 
bank. It is questionable whether using the loan portfolio, net of impairment, is relevant. 





impairments and not of a true contraction of the loan portfolio via sales of loan pools. 
This might bias the loan-to-deposit ratio downwards. Nevertheless, making loan 
impairments is very important since it allows the loan portfolio to be freed from some of 
its wastes.  
Profitability analysis 
This section analyses the evolution of the four studied bank’s profitability once the 
deleveraging process has been undertaken. Data used for the purpose of the analysis 
come from the banks’ annual reports. 
Net Interest Income 
Net interest incomes of the four studied banks have tremendously decreased. Between 
2009 and 2013, the net interest incomes of BES, BPI, CGD and BCP declined respectively 
by 13.87%, 23.89%, 43.29% and 36.43% (Appendix 20). Reasons for this huge decrease 
are numerous and are partly explained by the balance sheet adjustments operated by the 
banks. As mentioned previously, financial constraints imposed by the economic 
adjustment program forced banks to separate themselves from some assets which has 
therefore led to a drastic reduction in interest income. Because of the reduction in assets, 
interest expenses also went down but not proportionally. The decrease was, indeed, 
smaller because of the changes in sources of financing operated by banks. They turned to 
more stable but also more expensive resources such as customer deposits as well as hybrid 
capital instruments such as Coco’s. One should also bear in mind that given the situation 
of the economy, costs of funding increased, which narrowed the net interest income. 
Another reason is also the repricing of assets in a context of historically low levels of 






Other sources of income 
As far as other sources of income, such as dividend from equity investments and net 
commissions perceived, are concerned, there is no clear trend among the four banks. 
Income from dividends decreased a lot at BES and CGD, because of the sale of equity 
stakes in companies operated by these two banks. 
Cost to Income Ratio 
The cost to income ratio is currently in an upward trend, reflecting the decrease in net 
interest margin and other income for the four studied banks. This put a downward pressure 
on profitability forcing the banks to take measures that reduce operating costs. The ratio 
increased respectively by 39.24%, 7.11%, 26.69% and 13.42% for BES, BPI, CGD and 
BCP between 2009 and 2013 (Appendix 21). Both the operating costs and operating 
income decreased but the decrease in operating income was bigger, due mainly to a 
smaller net interest income. As far as operating costs are concerned, they have also 
globally decreased, due to a decrease in the number of branches and employees, such as 
for Banco Espirito Santo and BPI. 
Profitability of the studied banks is therefore decreasing because of the economic 
conditions and the adjustments banks had to make to their balance sheets, narrowing the 
sources of revenue and increasing the cost of financing. Therefore, this led to a decrease 
in efficiency that the banks are currently trying to offset by a reduction in operating 
expenses. However, reducing operating expenses cannot be done infinitely and takes 
more time than it takes to decrease net interest income, which suggests that profitability 
and efficiency can increase but might never return to their historical pre-crisis levels. It 
should be noted that the low level of inflation currently in Europe also doesn’t help the 






In May 2014, Portugal exited its three year bailout. Thanks to the programme, banks 
avoided a liquidity squeeze: they were able to cover the losses they faced due to high 
levels of loans and other assets impairments while reaching target ratios imposed by the 
economic adjustment programme. Those targets have been achieved at the pace of a 
heavy contraction of the loan portfolio and the search for more stable sources of funding.  
Today, this deleveraging process is still going on. However, these achievements have to 
be counterbalanced by the fact that profitability plummeted down. Net interest income is 
now at historically low levels and with the new structure of Portuguese banks’ balance 
sheets, there is no indication that it will go up in the future. Banks, by selling some loans 
and business lines have narrowed the sources of revenues and might even have strangled 
them. One can question whether a low profitability is sustainable on a long term basis and 
if Portuguese banks are still competitive nowadays. It is difficult to answer the question 
since a lot of non-recurring operations were done in recent years and other countries are 
also implementing BASEL III regulations which set similar targets as the one imposed 
by the adjustment programs. Non-Portuguese banks might, therefore, face the same 
problems. As far as risk profile is concerned, thanks to the deleveraging process, 
Portuguese banks are less risky than before. However, even though Portugal is no longer 
subject to the economic adjustment programme, Portuguese banks need to continue the 
deleveraging process and get rid of as many bad assets as possible. The Portuguese 
economy is still fragile, consequently leading to high levels of impairment of loans and 
other assets. As a result, some banks still have negative net income and still need new 
capital to cover their losses.  Portuguese banks undertook the necessary process to become 
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Appendix 1: Targets ratios of Espirito Santo 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Grupo Banco Espirito 
Santo. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. ,Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Grupo Banco 
Espirito Santo 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Grupo Banco Espirito 
Santo. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. ,Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Grupo Banco 
Espirito Santo 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
Appendix 2: Espirito Santo Share Capital 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Grupo Banco Espirito 
Santo. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. ,Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Grupo Banco 
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Appendix 3: Espirito Santo Customer’s Deposits 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Grupo Banco Espirito 
Santo. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. ,Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Grupo Banco 
Espirito Santo 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
Appendix 4: Espirito Santo’s loan portfolio (in thousands euros) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total Gross Loan 53,958,000.00 52,606,000.00 51,211,000.00 50,399,000.00 49,722,000.00 
Mortgage 
14,779,000.00 11,701,000.00 11,610,000.00 11,133,000.00 10,815,000.00 
Individuals 
2,817,000.00 2,822,000.00 2,716,000.00 2,628,000.00 2,383,000.00 
Corporate 36,362,000.00 38,083,000.00 36,885,000.00 36,637,000.00 36,524,000.00 
Source: Own source adapted from Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Grupo Banco Espirito 
Santo. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. ,Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Grupo Banco 
Espirito Santo 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
Appendix 5: Espirito Santo Risk Weighted Assets 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Grupo Banco Espirito 
Santo. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. ,Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Grupo Banco 








2009 2010 2011 2012 2013









2010 2011 2012 2013





Appendix 6: Target Ratios of Banco BPI 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Banco BPI. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco BPI. 2012. “Annual Report 
2011”. , Banco BPI. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Banco BPI. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Banco BPI. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco BPI. 2012. “Annual Report 
2011”. , Banco BPI. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Banco BPI. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
Appendix 7: BPI’s Share Capital  
 
Source: Own source adapted from Banco BPI. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco BPI. 2012. “Annual Report 
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Appendix 8: BPI’s Customer Deposits  
 
Source: Own source adapted from Banco BPI. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco BPI. 2012. “Annual Report 
2011”. , Banco BPI. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Banco BPI. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
Appendix 9: BPI’s loan portfolio (thousand euros) 











17,630,970.00 23,003,811.00 21,919,529.00 21,053,002.00 19,790,515.00 
Companies 
 




12,819,673.00 13,339,120.00 12,954,405.00 13,121,656.00 12,605,719.00 
Housing 
 
11,113,756.00 11,682,269.00 11,359,068.00 11,743,141.00 11,390,108.00 
Consumer 
 




683,482.00 630,916.00 571,571.00 550,503.00 498,513.00 
Foreign Loans 
 
4,807,358.00 4,442,598.00 3,682,018.00 3,474,962.00 3,237,243.00 
Companies 
 




466,292.00 533,805.00 521,710.00 544,419.00 521,413.00 
Housing 
 
192,992.00 242,903.00 162,516.00 161,429.00 210,177.00 
Consumer 
 
218,097.00 242,009.00 283,484.00 305,101.00 223,910.00 
Other loans 
 55,203.00 48,893.00 75,710.00 77,889.00 87,326.00 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Banco BPI. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco BPI. 2012. “Annual Report 
















Appendix 10: BPI’s Risk Weighted Assets  
 
Source: Own source adapted from Banco BPI. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco BPI. 2012. “Annual Report 
2011”. , Banco BPI. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Banco BPI. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
Appendix 11: Caixa Geral Target Ratios 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2011. “Financial Statements 2010”. , Caixa Geral de 
Depositos. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. , Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Caixa Geral de 
Depositos. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2011. “Financial Statements 2010”. , Caixa Geral de 
Depositos. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. , Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Caixa Geral de 
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Appendix 12: Caixa Geral Share Capital 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2011. “Financial Statements 2010”. , Caixa Geral de 
Depositos. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. , Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Caixa Geral de 
Depositos. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
Appendix 13: Caixa Geral Deposits 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2011. “Financial Statements 2010”. , Caixa Geral de 
Depositos. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. , Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Caixa Geral de 
Depositos. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
Appendix 14: Caixa Geral Loan Portfolio (in thousands euros) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
CGD operations in Portugal 
65,061,000.00 64,382,000.00 61,482,000.00 58,335,000.00 
Corporate 
24,659,000.00 23,727,000.00 22,770,000.00 21,935,000.00 
General government 
3,663,000.00 4,333,000.00 3,481,000.00 3,056,000.00 
Institutionals and other 
1,010,000.00 1,691,000.00 1,983,000.00 1,524,000.00 
Individual customers 
35,729,000.00 34,631,000.00 33,249,000.00 31,820,000.00 
Mortgage loans 
34,030,000.00 33,183,000.00 31,957,000.00 30,674,000.00 
Other 
1,698,000.00 1,448,000.00 1,292,000.00 1,146,000.00 
Other CGD Group companies 
19,456,000.00 18,151,000.00 17,334,000.00 16,208,000.00 
Total 
84,517,000.00 81,631,000.00 78,816,000.00 74,542,000.00 
Source: Own source adapted from Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2011. “Financial Statements 2010”. , Caixa Geral de 
Depositos. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. , Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Caixa Geral de 
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Appendix 15: Target Ratios of BCP 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Banco Commercial Português. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco Commercial 
Português. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. , Banco Commercial Português. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Banco 
Commercial Português. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Banco Commercial Português. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco Commercial 
Português. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. , Banco Commercial Português. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Banco 
Commercial Português. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
Appendix 16: BCP’s share capital  
 
Source: Own source adapted from Banco Commercial Português. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco Commercial 
Português. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. , Banco Commercial Português. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Banco 
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Appendix 17: BCP’s deposits 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Banco Commercial Português. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco Commercial 
Português. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. , Banco Commercial Português. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Banco 
Commercial Português. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
Appendix 18: BCP’s loan portfolio (in thousands euros) 
 2010 2011 2012 
Mortgages 31,036,000 30,303,000 29,509,000 
Activity in Portugal 22,553,000 21,768,000 20,669,000 
International Activity 8,503,000 8,540,000 8,840,000 
Consumer Credits 4,846,000 4,497,000 4,247,000 
Activity in Portugal 2,922,000 2,689,000 2,469,000 
International Activity 1,924,000 1,808,000 1,778,000 
Companies 40,529,000 36,728,000 33,105,000 
Activity in Portugal 33,461,000 30,094,000 26,443,000 
International Activity 7,068,000 6,634,000 6,662,000 
Loans and advances to customers 76,411,000 71,533,000 66,861,000 
Activity in Portugal 58,917,000 54,552,000 49,581,000 
International Activity 17,494,000 16,981,000 17,280,000 
Source: Own source adapted from Banco Commercial Português. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco Commercial 
Português. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. , Banco Commercial Português. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Banco 

















Appendix 19: BCP’s risk weighted assets  
 
Source: Own source adapted from Banco Commercial Português. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco Commercial 
Português. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. , Banco Commercial Português. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Banco 
Commercial Português. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”. 
Appendix 20: Net Interest Incomes of the four banks 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Banco BPI. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco BPI. 2012. “Annual Report 
2011”. , Banco BPI. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Banco BPI. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”., Banco Commercial 
Português. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco Commercial Português. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. , Banco 
Commercial Português. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Banco Commercial Português. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”., 
Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2011. “Financial Statements 2010”. , Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2012. “Annual Report 
2011”. , Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2014. “Annual Report 
2013”., Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2012. “Annual 
Report 2011”. ,Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Grupo Banco Espirito Santo 2014. 
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Appendix 21: Operating Costs to Operating Incomes 
 
Source: Own source adapted from Banco BPI. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco BPI. 2012. “Annual Report 
2011”. , Banco BPI. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Banco BPI. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”., Banco Commercial 
Português. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Banco Commercial Português. 2012. “Annual Report 2011”. , Banco 
Commercial Português. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Banco Commercial Português. 2014. “Annual Report 2013”., 
Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2011. “Financial Statements 2010”. , Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2012. “Annual Report 
2011”. , Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Caixa Geral de Depositos. 2014. “Annual Report 
2013”., Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2011. “Annual Report 2010”. , Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2012. “Annual 
Report 2011”. ,Grupo Banco Espirito Santo. 2013. “Annual Report 2012”. , Grupo Banco Espirito Santo 2014. 
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